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The Complexity of the California 
Recall Election
The October 7, 2003 California Recall Elec-tion strained California’s direct democracy.
In recent California politics there has not been
a statewide election conducted on such short
notice; county election ofﬁcials were informed
on July 24 that the election would be held on
October 7. Nor has California recently seen a
ballot with so many candidates running for a
single statewide ofﬁce (see Mueller 1970).
Under easy ballot access requirements, Secre-
tary of State Kevin Shelley certiﬁed 135 can-
didates for the ofﬁcial ballot on August 13.1
In the recall, voters cast votes on (1)
whether to recall Governor Davis from ofﬁce,
and (2) his possible successor. These two vot-
ing decisions were made independent by the
federal district
court’s decision on
July 29. The
court’s decision in-
validated a state
law requiring a
vote on the recall
question in order
for a vote on the
successor election
to be counted (Part-
noy et al. 2003).
The abbreviated
election calendar
also led to many
improvisations, in-
cluding a dramati-
cally reduced num-
ber of precinct poll
sites throughout the
state and the un-
precedented ability
of military person-
nel, their depend-
ents, and civilians
living overseas to return their absentee ballots
by fax. These problems produced litigation
and speculation that substantial problems
would mar the election and throw the outcome
of both the recall and a possible successor’s
election into doubt. In the end, the litigation
failed to stall the recall election, and the large
ﬁnal vote margins on both the recall question
and the successor ballot seemingly over-
whelmed Election Day problems.
In this paper, we concentrate on some of
the problems produced by the complexity of
the recall election, but we do not attempt an
exhaustive presentation of these problems. We
focus on polling place problems on election
day, the problems associated with translating
the complicated recall election ballot into six
languages, how the long ballot inﬂuenced voter
behavior, and voter difﬁculties with the ballot
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measured with survey data. We conclude with
a short discussion of the possible impact of
these problems on the recall election.
Precinct Practices
The recall process was complicated by a va-
riety of logistical factors. Two issues—precinct
consolidations and the problem of serving the
language minority population—were most pro-
nounced in Los Angeles County, the largest
electoral jurisdiction in the United States. The
consolidation issue was discussed prior to the
election and spawned several lawsuits (Dolan
and Guccione 2003). In a statewide election,
local election ofﬁcials are normally required by
law to have one election precinct for approxi-
mately every 1,000 voters. Because the recall
election was called on short notice and election
ofﬁcials were cash-strapped, polling places
were consolidated to simplify the process of
managing elections. For example, in Los 
Angeles County the number of precincts went
from 4,922 in the 2002 general election to
1,786 in the recall election. Before the election,
many observers predicted that consolidations
would produce long lines, disgruntled voters,
and mistakes by harassed precinct workers.
County ofﬁcials, however, hoped that bringing
more voters to fewer locations could ensure
that the precincts that they did use would open
successfully and be properly staffed.2
The precinct consolidations confused many
voters, even though, prior to the election, the
County sent every voter a guide that included
the street address of their poll site. Many vot-
ers went to the most convenient poll site and
voted. Because the ballot was the same coun-
tywide, registered Los Angeles County voters
could cast a legal ballot at any precinct in the
county using the provisional balloting process.
Over 100,000 provisional ballots were cast,
more than have ever been cast in any election
in Los Angeles County. 
In other instances, the precinct consolida-
tions generated confusion and long lines. 
Fifteen polling places in Los Angeles County
failed to open on time, with the latest opening
about an hour late. Two of us toured polling
places throughout Los Angeles County on elec-
tion day.3 In one voting location in downtown
Los Angeles, the polling location was inside a
closed electronic gate (with no directions on
how to enter). Once inside the gate, the voter
had to ﬁnd a small elevator, proceed (confus-
ingly, as the elevator appeared to be on the
ground ﬂoor) down to the third ﬂoor, and from
there ﬁnd a poorly marked room to vote. In
another voting location (inside a tire shop!),
we witnessed a long line of voters waiting impatiently in the
middle of the morning to vote; the poll workers had estab-
lished an inefﬁcient means of checking voter registrations (and
it didn’t help matters that instead of removing a malfunctioning
vote recorder from service, a handful of polling place workers
ignored the long line and proceeded to try to ﬁx the one of
perhaps a dozen vote recorders). Throughout the day, we saw
examples of voters having difﬁculty understanding how to vote,
questions arising about provisional balloting procedures, and
polling places running out of provisional or regular ballots.
These sorts of problems were scattered, and not systematic.
Although many voters were likely affected by polling place
problems, it does not appear from any information currently
available that these problems were of sufﬁcient magnitude to
call the recall election into doubt. However, there is no ques-
tion that there were problems in polling places on October 7.
Multilingual Voting Problems
A second, largely ignored, issue arose with the ballot and
the two-part nature of the recall election. Speciﬁcally, in the
four Asian languages that Los Angeles County is required to
serve under language minority provisions of the Voting Rights
Act—Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese—it was very
difﬁcult to translate the recall question. 
As Rosa Flores with the Los Angeles County Registrar-
Recorder, County Clerk’s Ofﬁce explained, “There are words
that do not translate into other languages exactly and ‘recall’
is one of them. Sometimes, because there are not exact words
that exist, they sometimes make up a new word by using the
English. Sometimes the insinuation does not translate, so the
translators may have the word correct but the meaning isn’t
quite right.” This problem was clear in interviews with voters
and pollworkers conducted in Chinatown and Koreatown (in
downtown Los Angeles), though the extent of this problem is
impossible to assess after the election. For example, an elderly
Korean man repeatedly explained to us that he didn’t under-
stand how to vote on the two questions and that the Korean
language newspapers did not adequately explain the meaning
of the recall election.
A poll worker we interviewed in Chinatown noticed two in-
teresting phenomena. First, the concept of the recall did not
translate well. Many voters were confused about to how they
could vote “No” on the recall but then vote for a replacement
candidate. Second, many of these voters were less interested
in the recall and more interested in defeating Proposition 54,
which would ban the collection of information by race or eth-
nicity. This problem manifested itself in a high residual vote
rate on the recall question in high immigrant population
precincts (Hoffman 2003). 
Other data implies that voter confusion about how to vote
on the recall ballot’s two questions extended beyond the multi-
lingual community. In a telephone survey of California voters
(which we discuss more completely below), conducted in the
week prior to the election, we found that over 6% of the re-
spondents who preferred Davis to all other candidates indi-
cated that they favored the recall. Given there is no reasonable
strategy that could justify such a choice, we think it is very
likely that some voters believed that in order to vote for
Davis, they needed to vote yes on the recall.
Ballot Design and “Vertical Proximity”
In the recall election, each county designed its own ballot
and selected its voting machines—punch cards, optical scan,
and touchscreen voting.4 All ballots listed the candidates based
on a random alphabetical ordering drawn by the secretary of
state. In the ﬁrst Assembly District, the names of candidates
appeared on the ballot in the random alphabetical order, but in
the second Assembly district the ﬁrst candidate of the random
alphabetical list moved to the last place and all other candi-
dates moved up one position.5 This procedure was repeated for
the remaining 78 Assembly districts. Regardless of exact posi-
tion, the same two “neighbor” candidates determined by the
randomized alphabet surround a name.6 To examine the added
beneﬁt of proximity to a high vote-receiver, we compared the
amount of votes neighboring candidates received as a function
of how many positions they were away from a prominent can-
didate. Using county level election returns reported by the Cali-
fornia secretary of state, we constructed the relative amount of
votes by summing the votes of the pair of candidates who
were +i, −i positions away from the top candidate and divid-
ing the number of votes they received by the number of votes
the top candidate received, per 1,000 voters. For example:
(Votes for Lawrence Strauss + Votes for George
Schwartzman) * 1,000/Votes for Arnold Schwarzenegger. This
value was calculated for the neighboring candidates who were
one, two, and three positions away from Schwarzenegger, Cruz
Bustamante, and Tom McClintock, respectively. Table 1 shows
the additional votes per thousand that neighboring candidates
received in relation to their position away from a top-three
vote getter.7
The consistency across candidates demonstrates that all
neighbors beneﬁt from the same effect. While their absolute
votes vary, the increase in absolute votes is proportional to the
votes their top-three neighbor candidates received. A simple
model of this effect is that the number of votes a neighbor
candidate receives is the sum of their base vote (deﬁned as
the average votes received by all non-top vote getters) plus an
additional 0.004% of the votes received by the top vote-
receiving adjacent candidate. The ratio for candidates two and
three positions away increases from Schwarzenegger to Busta-
mante to McClintock because the initial ratio of base vote to
top candidate vote increases: (base vote/McClintock) > (base
vote/Bustamante) > (base vote/Schwarzenegger), as the 
absolute vote of the top candidate decreases (McClintock < 
Bustamante < Schwarzenegger). 
What is the causal mechanism producing the vertical proxim-
ity effect? One possible answer is voter alignment errors: voters
see the name of the candidate they intend to vote for, but in-
stead mark their ballot to cast a vote for one of the neighboring
candidates.8 Bad eyesight, shaky hands, or even left-handedness
could cause voters to misalign their decision mark with their
candidate choice.9 The other possible explanation for the prox-
imity effect is voting machine problems. Punch card ballots may
increase the chances of alignment errors, regardless of voter
characteristics, because punch card ballots can be incorrectly 
inserted into the vote recorder. Many of the problems in the 
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Table 1
Vertical Proximity Effect 
Votes Received per 1,000 by Neighbor Candidates
Position Away
Candidate 1 2 3
Schwarzenegger 4.199 0.619 0.472
Bustamante 4.429 0.831 0.686
McClintock 4.380 1.490 1.284
recount of the Florida presidential vote in 2000 focused on
alignment errors in the format of the punch card ballots, for ex-
ample, problems associated with the butterﬂy ballot.10 We esti-
mated the differences in average vertical proximity effects
across counties using punch cards, optically scanned ballots, or
touchscreens. Punch card technologies showed vertical proximity
effects that were almost two votes per 1,000 higher.11 Vertical
alignment effects between optical scan and touchscreen tech-
nologies were not statistically distinguishable.
Vertical proximity effects suggest that ballot order is not
neutral, even when randomized. There may be other problems
with ballot design, such as top of the page effects or horizon-
tal proximity effects. Although we have studied one fairly
unique election with a restricted set of alignments, the appear-
ance of clear vertical proximity effects and their variance
across ballot types suggests that the randomization of names
on the ballot in California is not neutral and the need remains
for careful systematic evaluation of ballot designs. Although
there are many possible explanations for this effect, it is likely
caused by difﬁculties voters have aligning names with voting
options and this effect apparently hampered the accurate re-
ﬂection of voter intention in the recall election.
Difﬁculties With Ballot Design and
Voter Conﬁdence
There is also evidence that this complicated election inﬂu-
enced voter perceptions. The Los Angeles Times exit poll,
which interviewed 5,205 voters at 74 polling places
statewide, included a question asking “How easy or difﬁcult
was it to locate your candidate on the ballot?” As the ﬁrst
two columns of Table 2 show, the vast majority of voters
found it easy to locate their candidate on the ballot
(81.33%), but some voters found it difﬁcult (18.67%). Also,
4.59% stated it was “very difﬁcult” to ﬁnd their candidate on
the ballot, and 13.57% said it was “somewhat difﬁcult.”
While 18.67% is a small percentage, we estimate that as
many as 1.7 million of the 8.9 million voters statewide found
it difﬁcult to ﬁnd their candidate on the ballot, with possibly
400,000 voters ﬁnding it “very difﬁcult” to locate their can-
didate on the ballot.12
If we breakdown the responses to this exit poll question
for three variables, partisanship, education, and race, we see
that Republicans were approximately half as likely to report
having troubles ﬁnding their candidate on the ballot. We also
see a surprising pattern with respect to education: voters at
the lower end of the educational spectrum were less likely
(11.85% had difﬁculty) to express having trouble ﬁnding
their candidate on the ballot than those with a post-college
education (25.88% had difﬁculty). Last, we see that Latinos
reported less difﬁculty ﬁnding their candidate on the ballot
(14.53% reported difﬁculty), compared to the other major
racial and ethnic groups.
In the last two columns of data in Table 2, we report re-
sults from a telephone survey of 1,457 registered voters con-
ducted before the recall election.13 This survey asked respon-
dents (who said they had already voted absentee or early, or
that they planned to vote on election day), “How much conﬁ-
dence do you have that your vote in the current election will
be recorded and counted correctly?” Despite all of the poten-
tial problems and the attention they received in the media,
most voters (84.49% of the sample) felt conﬁdent that their
ballots would be recorded and counted correctly. However,
15.51% lacked conﬁdence, which implies that 1.4 million vot-
ers may have lacked conﬁdence in the accurate recording and
counting of their ballots. We also see in Table 2 that the lack
of conﬁdence in the accurate recording and counting of ballots
in the recall election was much lower among Republicans.14
Furthermore, voters with a high school education or less were
less conﬁdent that their vote would be counted than were
those with higher levels of educational attainment. Finally,
White voters were much more conﬁdent that their vote would
be accurately recorded and counted: 10.62% of Whites were
not conﬁdent, in contrast to 32.2% of Blacks, 26.19% of
Asians, and 23.83% of Latinos.
Did These Complexities Inﬂuence the 
Outcome of the Recall Election?
A great deal of attention is now paid to election procedures
and the myriad of problems that were identiﬁed in the wake
of the 2000 presidential election. As has been pointed out fre-
quently by many observers, nothing new really occurred in the
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Table 2
Ballot Difﬁculties and Voter Conﬁdence
Finding Candidate Conﬁdence in Ballot Counting
Easy Difﬁcult Conﬁdent Not Conﬁdent
Survey Percentages 81.33 18.67 84.49 15.51
Partisanship Democrat 75.95 25.05 78.42 21.58
Republican 87.2 12.8 92.84 7.16
DTS/Indep 79.13 20.87 82.84 17.16
Other 74.83 25.17 74.19 25.81
Education High School 88.15 11.85 79.35 20.65
College 82.82 17.18 85.66 14.34
Post-college 74.12 25.88 85.93 14.01
Race White 81.04 18.96 89.38 10.62
Black 78.2 21.8 67.8 32.2
Latino 85.47 14.53 76.17 23.83
Asian 79.85 20.15 73.81 26.19
Notes
*We thank Conny McCormack (Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder)
and Susan Pinkus (director of the Los Angeles Times Poll) for some of the
data used in this paper. We also thank the California Institute of Technol-
ogy and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for their support.
1. The California Election Code was oddly silent on the exact ballot ac-
cess requirements for a statewide recall election. Secretary of State Shel-
ley made the barriers quite low: candidates either had to provide 10,000
signatures of registered voters and no ﬁling fee, or 65 signatures from
registered voters and a $3,500 ﬁling fee. 
2. In addition to working to make precinct voting work efﬁciently with
fewer polling places, county election ofﬁcials worked to expand early vot-
ing opportunities and to facilitate absentee voting. At least 28 of the 58
counties allowed early voting in the recall election.
3. Alvarez and Hall conducted all of the interviews discussed in this section.
4. In our analysis we exclude Alpine County (which used paper bal-
lots), which provided 0.0067% of the votes cast and which does not pro-
vide a large enough sample to study their ballot format. 
5. Empirical research on ballot design has documented a potential top-
of-the-ballot effect: a propensity for candidates appearing at the top of the
ballot to receive, solely by nature of their position, more votes than other
candidates. A standard practice to correct this problem is the rotation of
the random alphabetical ordering. For recent research, see Jennifer A.
Steen and Jonathan G. S. Koppell, forthcoming; Jon A. Krosnick, Joanne
M. Miller, and Michael P. Tichy 2003. 
6. The only exceptions are the assembly districts in which the candi-
date’s name is listed in the ﬁrst position or in the 135th position. Even in
these two districts, the candidate will be adjacent to one of his two neigh-
bor candidates, while his other adjacent spot is empty. 
7. This value was also calculated for the fourth highest vote recipient,
Camejo, but at this level the results are within the margin of error and are
not statistically signiﬁcant. 
2000 presidential election. There was a very close election,
one that hinged on the outcome in Florida, where a lack of
sound procedures for recounting ballots, long lines in polling
places, problems with voter registration lists, and the use of
antiquated voting machines with high “residual vote rates”
produced concerns about the accuracy of the election (and re-
count) result. These problems occurred throughout the nation
in 2000, producing an estimated 4 to 6 million “lost” votes in
the presidential race (of the total 105,405,100 votes cast) (Cal-
tech/MIT Voting Technology Project 2001).
Were the same proportion of votes—somewhere between 3
to 5% of ballots cast—“lost” in the 2000 California recall
election? Until the ﬁnal certiﬁed results of the election are
available, detailed statistical analyses of residual vote rates can
be calculated, and other data on administrative issues in the
recall election (in particular, the numbers of disqualiﬁed provi-
sional and absentee ballots) are known, it is difﬁcult to esti-
mate a precise “lost” vote rate for the recall election. The 
preliminary analyses presented in this paper suggest that there
are grounds for concern. We know that:
• the dramatic precinct consolidations in the recall election
produced problems in polling places throughout the state; 
• non-English speaking voters had difﬁculty understanding
the complicated ballot; 
• the design of the ballot, in particular the long list of can-
didate names, produced a “vertical proximity” effect that
might have affected many votes cast; 
• sizeable numbers of voters had difﬁculty ﬁnding their can-
didates on the ballot and lacked conﬁdence that their bal-
lots were accurately tabulated and counted.
More careful and detailed analyses are required for us to
understand these issues clearly.
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